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DELIMITING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 
NAUTICAL MILES AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 








In both Nicaragua v. Colombia cases, the International Court of Justice upheld 
that international tribunals may delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles prior to the establishment of the continental shelf’s outer limits. 
However, both the 2012 judgment on the merits and the 2016 judgment on 
preliminary objections raise a number of controversial issues. This article 
discusses the contentious aspects of the ICJ’s judgments in both Nicaragua v. 
Colombia cases. First, it argues that the ICJ’s decisions should have more 
strongly upheld that overlapping entitlements are a necessary precondition to 
maritime delimitation both within and beyond 200 nautical miles, with 
reference to the evaluation of evidence of entitlement provided by the parties. 
Second, it examines the persuasiveness of the “practical impasse” argument 




I. The ICJ and delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles 
 
1. Delimiting maritime boundaries is the order of the day at the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). Maritime delimitation has been a central 
part of the Court’s activity since the 1969 judgment in North Sea Continental 
Shelf.1 Since 2000, the ICJ handed down six judgments on the merits in 
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1  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3. 
2 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
disputes including a maritime delimitation aspect,2 and at the time of writing 
there are three maritime delimitation cases pending before the Court.3  
2. Despite the ICJ’s extensive delimitation activity, it is only in the two 
recent judgments between Nicaragua and Colombia that the Court was 
requested to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm). 
Nicaragua initiated the first case by unilateral application in 2001, requesting 
the ICJ inter alia to “determine the course of the single maritime boundary 
between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone 
appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia”.4 In the written 
proceedings, Nicaragua amended its claim and asked the Court to delimit the 
overlapping continental shelves of the two parties, owing to the fact that the 
parties’ mainland coasts lay more than 400 nm apart and Nicaragua’s 
continental shelf extended beyond 200 nm.5 The Court addressed this claim in 
its judgment of 19 November 2012, finding that “Nicaragua […] has not 
                                                        
2  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, ICJ Reports 2001, 40; Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Merits, ICJ 
Reports 2002, 303; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2007, 659; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. 
Ukraine), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, 61; Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, 624; Maritime 
Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2014, 3. 
3  Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua 
and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), filed 16 September 2013 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=02&case=154&code=nicolb); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), filed 28 
August 2014 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=SK&case=161&k=00); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa 
Rica v. Nicaragua), filed 25 February 2014 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=crnic&case=157&k=0f). A 
further maritime delimitation dispute is currently pending before a Special 
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see Dispute 
concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), filed 3 December 2014 
(https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/case-no-23-merits/). 
4  Application instituting Proceedings (6 December 2001), 8, para.8 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/7079.pdf). 
5  Reply of Nicaragua (18 September 2009), 66, para.2.10 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/124/16971.pdf). 
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established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap 
with Colombia’s 200‑nautical‑mile entitlement to the continental shelf”.6 
Therefore, the Court did not delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in 
2012.  
3. The second case was filed by Nicaragua against Colombia in 2013, as a 
follow-up to the 2012 Judgment. Nicaragua requested the Court to establish 
“[t]he precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and 
Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of 
them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 
November 2012”.7 In other words, Nicaragua requested the Court to establish 
the maritime boundary beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s own coast. 
Although this case is still pending, the Court has already rejected Colombia’s 
preliminary objections in its judgment of 17 March 2016, in which it made 
two crucial findings. First, it found that the 2012 judgment was not res judicata 
in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Second, 
it held that maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm can be delimited even if the 
continental shelf’s outer limits have not been delineated, as in the case of 
Nicaragua’s continental shelf beyond 200 nm.8 The dispute is due to proceed 
to the merits stage.9  
4. The 2012 Nicaragua v. Colombia judgment (Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012)) 
raised a number of maritime delimitation issues, which have been exhaustively 
addressed in the literature.10 This article deals with a question that such 
                                                        
6  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 669, para.129. On the 2012 
judgment, see section III.A below. 
7  Application instituting Proceedings (16 September 2013), 8, para.12, 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/17532.pdf). 
8  While “delineation” is the establishment of the continental shelf’s outer 
limits, “delimitation” designates the process of establishing maritime 
boundaries between neighbouring States. ITLOS made this distinction clear 
in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 
2012, 4, 99, para.376.  
9  On the 2012 judgment, see section III.B below. 
10  Naomi Burke, Nicaragua v. Colombia at the ICJ: Better the Devil you 
Don’t?, 2 Cambridge JICL (2013), 314; Lucie Delabie, Le Fragile Équilibre 
entre Prévisibilité Juridique et Opportunité Judiciaire en Matière de 
Délimitation Maritime: l’Arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans 
l’Affaire du Différend Territorial et Maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), 58 
AFDI (2012), 223; Serena Forlati, Delimitazione dei Confini Marittimi e Stati 
Terzi: il Caso Nicaragua c. Colombia, 96 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 
4 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
contributions have not discussed: the delineation of the continental shelf’s 
outer limits as a precondition for delimitation beyond 200 nm. This article 
also discusses the 2016 preliminary objections judgment in the second 
Nicaragua v. Colombia case (Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016)). The discussion 
focuses on Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection concerning the relationship 
between delimitation and delineation of the continental shelf’s outer limits. 
This article argues that, concerning continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 
nm, the ICJ’s 2012 and 2016 decisions are not entirely convincing.  
5.  Section II briefly sets out the role of overlapping maritime 
entitlements as a precondition to delimitation, both within and beyond 200 
nm. Section III outlines the ICJ’s decisions in the 2012 and 2016 judgments. 
With reference to the 2012 judgment, Section IV discusses whether the 
submission of information to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS or the Commission) should be considered a 
precondition to continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm. With respect to 
the 2016 judgment, Section V analyses whether the CLCS’s recommendations 
on the continental shelf’s outer limits should be considered a precondition to 
continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm. Section VI concludes. This 
article does not discuss the appropriateness of using the three-stage 
delimitation process in delimitation beyond 200 nm.11 
 
II. Overlapping entitlements as the sine qua non of delimitation  
6. There can be no maritime boundary delimitation without neighbouring 
States having overlapping entitlements over maritime areas adjacent to their 
coasts.12 In Black Sea, the ICJ held that “the task of delimitation consists in 
resolving the overlapping claims by drawing a line of separation of the 
maritime areas concerned”.13 The ICJ referred to “overlapping claims”, not to 
“overlapping entitlements”. According to Evans, this “is not entirely 
accurate”, since “just because a State claims that it has an entitlement does not 
                                                                                                                                
(2013), 135; Jianjun Gao, A Note on the Nicaragua v. Colombia Case, 44 
Ocean Development & Int’l L (2013), 219; Joanna Mossop, The Continental 
Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles – Rights and Responsibilities (2016), 77-80; 
Yoshifumi Tanaka, Reflections on the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
between Nicaragua and Colombia before the International Court of Justice, 
26 Leiden JIL (2013), 909. 
11  The Court first set forth the three-stage delimitation process in the 2009 
Black Sea judgment. See Black Sea, above n.2, 101-103, paras.115-122. 
12  The coasts of neighbouring States could be either opposite or adjacent. 
13  Black Sea, above n.2, 89, para.77. 
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mean that it does”.14 However, in Peru v. Chile the Court stated that it would 
“proceed with the delimitation of the overlapping maritime entitlements of 
the Parties”.15 In Peru v. Chile the Court showed awareness of the difference 
between claims and entitlements, rectifying its previous statement in Black Sea.  
7. The existence of overlapping entitlements is a precondition for the 
delimitation of any maritime zone.16 As the term suggests, maritime 
entitlements are a function of the basis of title over the maritime zones 
established under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
or the Convention).17 Concerning the maritime zones within 200 nm, the basis 
of title is considered to be distance from a State’s coast. The territorial sea is 
defined under Article 3 UNCLOS as a function of distance from the coast;18 
the same applies both to the EEZ under Article 57 UNCLOS,19 and to the 
continental shelf under Article 76 UNCLOS.20 Owing to the influence of 
                                                        
14  Malcolm Evans, Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in: Donald Rothwell et al. 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (2015), 254, 261. 
15  Peru v. Chile, above n.2, 67, para.189. 
16  Jensen wrote that “Articles 76 and 83 are […] connected in the sense that 
delimitation of the continental shelf presupposes the existence of a shelf to 
delimit”. See Øystein Jensen, Maritime Boundary Delimitation Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles: The International Judiciary and the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, 84 Nordic JIL (2015), 580, 583. 
17  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 
December 1982, in force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.  
18  Under Art. 3 UNCLOS, “[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth 
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention”. Under Art. 
5 UNCLOS, the normal baseline coincides with the low-water line on a 
State’s coast, unless the coastal State has implemented a straight baseline 
system in accordance with Art. 7 UNCLOS. See Prosper Weil, Des Espaces 
Maritimes aux Territoires Maritimes: Vers un Conception Territorialiste de la 
Délimitation Maritime, in: Le Droit International au Service de la Paix, de la 
Justice et du Développement – Mélanges Michel Virally (1991), 501, 504. 
19  Art. 57 UNCLOS provides that “[t]he exclusive economic zone shall not 
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured”. See Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, 13, 33, para.34. 
20  Art. 76(1) UNCLOS states that “[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State 
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond 
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to 
the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
6 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
North Sea Continental Shelf, some doubts persisted concerning the basis of title 
over the continental shelf within 200 nm. However, the ICJ dispelled such 
doubts in its 1985 Libya/Malta judgment, by stating that “for juridical and 
practical reasons, the distance criterion must now apply to the continental 
shelf as well as to the exclusive economic zone”.21  
8. Article 76(1) UNCLOS provides that “[t]he continental shelf of a 
coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that 
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin”. Article 76 entails 
that if the geomorphological continental margin protrudes into the sea further 
than 200 nm from the coast, the coastal State is entitled to exercise 
continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm. Accordingly, the basis of title over the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm is linked to the existence of a physical 
continental margin extending beyond 200 nm from the coast.22 Paragraphs 4 
to 8 of Article 76 UNCLOS create a complex procedure for delineating the 
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This procedure requires 
the identification of such outer limits by the coastal State concerned in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in paragraphs 4 to 7. Paragraph 8 
provides that: 
[i]nformation on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles […] shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf […]. The Commission shall make 
recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the 
establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of 
the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these 
recommendations shall be final and binding. 
9. At a minimum, Article 76 UNCLOS is silent on the precise relationship 
between delimitation and delineation. Coastal States delineate the continental 
shelf’s outer limits. However, such limits become “final and binding” only 
after the CLCS has ascertained a coastal State’s entitlement beyond 200 nm by 
delivering a recommendation on the matter.23 In Bangladesh/Myanmar, the first 
                                                                                                                                
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up 
to that distance”. 
21  Libya/Malta, above n.19, 33, para.34. 
22  Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2nd 
ed., 2016), 114-115. 
23   On the delineation process, see Bjarni Már Magnússon, The Continental 
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case involving the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS or the Tribunal) was 
requested to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in a situation in 
which neither State party had established the continental shelf’s outer limits in 
accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS. ITLOS held that “in order to fulfil its 
responsibilities under […] the Convention in the present case, it has an 
obligation to adjudicate the dispute and to delimit the continental shelf 
between the Parties beyond 200 nm”.24 ITLOS’s statement entails that the 
Convention does not require delineation prior to delimitation. This decision 
was later adopted in Bangladesh v. India.25 However, this approach is not 
uncontroversial, which may call into question the persuasiveness of the 
decisions in Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh v. India.26 This issue was 
indirectly at stake in both Nicaragua v. Colombia cases. 
 
III. The 2012 and 2016 Nicaragua v. Colombia judgments  
10.  In both Nicaragua v. Colombia cases, Colombia argued that the Court could 
not delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s coast. On 
one hand, Nicaragua had not obtained the CLCS’s recommendation on its 
continental shelf’s outer limits in accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS. On 
the other hand, Colombia was not a party to UNCLOS, and it was therefore 
not bound by Article 76. The Court addressed such arguments both in the 
2012 judgment and in the 2016 judgment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles – Delineation, Delimitation and Dispute 
Settlement (2015), 40-116. 
24  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 103, para.394. As explained in section III 
below, the ICJ followed suit in subsequent cases. 
25  Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award 
of 7 July 2014, 167 ILR 1, 32, para.80. 
26  For instance, Kunoy argues that delineation is a precondition to delimitation. 
See Bjørn Kunoy, The Admissibility of a Plea to an International 
Adjudicative Forum to Delimit the Outer Continental Shelf Prior to the 
Adoption of Final Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, 25 Int’l J Marine & Coastal L (2010), 237. Magnússon 
supports the view that international tribunals can delimit the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm absent the establishment of the shelf’s outer limits. See 
Bjarni Már Magnússon, Is there a Temporal Relationship between the 
Delineation and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 
Nautical Miles?, 28 Int’l J Marine & Coastal L (2013), 465. 
8 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
III.A. The 2012 judgment on the merits 
11.  In Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), Nicaragua’s request for delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm arose out of its own oversight. Both in the 
Application and in the Memorial, Nicaragua asked the Court to delimit a 
single maritime boundary dividing the EEZ and continental shelf enclosed 
between the Nicaraguan and the Colombian mainland.27 Colombia argued that 
Nicaragua had not realised that the two mainland coasts lay further than 400 
nm from each other, stating that “the geographic situation does not give rise 
on the legal plane to an issue of delimitation as between the mainland coasts 
of the Parties”.28 In the Reply, Nicaragua submitted that its continental shelf 
entitlement extended beyond 200 nm from its coast, thus overlapping with 
Colombia’s continental shelf entitlement. Nicaragua argued that its continental 
shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm overlapped with Colombia’s continental 
shelf entitlement within 200 nm of Colombia’s own mainland coast.29 
According to Nicaragua, delimitation should thus also be effected between the 
parties’ continental shelves.30 However, Colombia argued that there could not 
be delimitation beyond 200 nm without a recommendation from the CLCS 
concerning the outer limits of Nicaragua’s continental shelf, as “Nicaragua’s 
purported rights to the extended continental shelf out to the outer edge of the 
continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles have never been recognized or 
even submitted to the [CLCS]”.31  
12. Colombia saw the filing of a submission to the CLCS as the means to 
provide the Commission with the necessary evidence to ascertain the 
                                                        
27  Application, above n.4, 8, para.8; Memorial of Nicaragua (28 April 2003), 
191, para.3.15, (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/13870.pdf). 
28  Counter-memorial of Colombia (11 November 2008), 314, para.7.12, 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/16969.pdf). 
29  Reply of Nicaragua (18 September 2009), 66, para.2.10, (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/124/16971.pdf). 
30  Ibid., 59, para.1. Nicaragua also discussed delimitation in the continental 
shelf and EEZ generated by its own mainland coast and by the coast of 
Colombia’s islands in the San Andrés Archipelago, arguing for Colombia’s 
islands to be enclaved. See ibid., 103-139, paras.4.1-5.27. By the time the 
Court handed down its 2012 judgment on the merits, it had already partially 
upheld Colombia’s preliminary objection, finding that it had no jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the matter of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, 
Providencia and Santa Catalina. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2007, 875-876, 
para.142. 
31  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 667, para.122. 
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existence of sovereign rights over the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 
Colombia argued that the evidence submitted to the CLCS by Nicaragua 
failed on its merits, being insufficient to prove entitlement to a continental 
shelf beyond 200 nm. At the time of the 2012 judgment, Nicaragua had only 
submitted “preliminary information” to the CLCS on the outer limits of its 
continental shelf in the Caribbean Sea.32 In Colombia’s view, this meant that 
Nicaragua had not yet demonstrated the existence of overlapping continental 
shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm of its coast.  
13. At the outset, the ICJ held that Nicaragua’s modification of its initial 
claim as lodged in the Application instituting proceedings did not render the 
request for delimitation beyond 200 nm from its coast inadmissible.33 
Although the Court found that this request “is a new claim in relation to the 
claims presented in the Application and the Memorial”,34 it held that 
Nicaragua’s “claim to an extended continental shelf falls within the dispute 
between the Parties relating to maritime delimitation and cannot be said to 
transform the subject-matter of that dispute”.35 Therefore, it stated that 
Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation beyond 200 nm was admissible. 
14. Subsequently, the Court discussed whether it could accede to 
Nicaragua’s request to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 
According to the Court, “the definition of the continental shelf set out in 
Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary international 
law”,36 and was thus binding on Colombia. Nicaragua sought to rely on 
Bangladesh/Myanmar in support of its argument that coastal States need not 
obtain a recommendation from the CLCS before requesting an international 
tribunal to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.37 However, the Court 
                                                        
32  Ibid., 669, para.127. See Preliminary Information of Nicaragua Indicative of 
the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf and Description of the Status of 
Preparation of Making a Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (7 April 2010) 
(http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/nic
_preliminaryinformation2010.pdf).  
33  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 662-665, paras.104-112. This 
decision was criticised by Judge Owada in his dissenting opinion. See ibid., 
721-729 (Dissenting Opinion Owada). 
34  Ibid., 664, paras.108. 
35  Ibid., 665, para.111. 
36  Ibid., 666, para.118. Colombia was not a party to UNCLOS. 
37  C.R. 2012/9, 30, para.49 (Lowe); ibid., 33, para.64 (Lowe); C.R. 2012/15, 17-
33, paras.1-97 (Lowe). Colombia also sought to rely on Bangladesh/Myanmar in 
10 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
stated that:  
in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks covers 
practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a 
unique situation and that this fact had been acknowledged in the course 
of negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea.38  
The Court seemed to recognise the exceptional character of the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar decision, and continued by emphasising that “both parties 
in the Bay of Bengal case were States parties to UNCLOS and had made full 
submissions to the [CLCS]”.39 The Court found that:  
since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established that it 
has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with 
Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, 
measured from Colombia’s mainland coast, the Court is not in a 
position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua 
and Colombia […].40  
The Court considered that it was necessary for Nicaragua to establish “that it 
has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 
200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf”.41  
15. Immediately before making such a finding, the Court observed that 
“Nicaragua submitted to the [CLCS] only ‘Preliminary Information’ which 
[…] falls short of meeting the requirements for information on the limits of 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles which ‘shall be submitted by 
the coastal State to the Commission’ in accordance with paragraph 8 of 
Article 76 of UNCLOS”.42 It seems that, while not explicitly saying it, the 
Court believed that establishing entitlement would require Nicaragua to 
provide scientific evidence that the continental margin extends beyond 200 
                                                                                                                                
its counter-argument. See C.R. 2012/12, 53-62, paras.45-84 (Bundy); C.R. 
2012/16, 51-52, paras.77-85 (Bundy). 
38  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 668, para.125. 
39  Ibid., 668, para.126. The exceptional character of the Bay of Bengal cases is 
discussed in section V.A below. 
40  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 669, para.129. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid., 669, para.127. 
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nm from its coast. However, this could not be achieved by only submitting 
“preliminary information” to the CLCS. For the Court, the question whether 
it could delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm depended not only on 
the existence of overlapping entitlements, but also on the proof that such 
entitlements existed. Nevertheless, the 2012 judgment left one wondering how 
entitlement could be definitively established. The 2016 judgment on 
preliminary objections provided the belated answer to this question. 
 
III.B. The 2016 judgment on preliminary objections 
16. Nicaragua made a full submission to the CLCS concerning the delineation 
of its continental shelf’s outer limits on 24 June 2013, three months before 
filing the second case against Colombia on 16 September 2013.43 On 14 
August 2014, Colombia raised preliminary objections, two of which are 
relevant to the present discussion. In the third preliminary objection, 
Colombia argued that the Court had already settled the dispute concerning 
delimitation beyond 200 nm in 2012, which entailed that the new case initiated 
by Nicaragua in 2013 was barred by res judicata in accordance with Articles 59-
60 of the Court’s Statute.44 Although this preliminary objection did not 
directly concern delimitation issues, the Court’s remarks clarified the 
reasoning of the 2012 judgment on the dismissal of Nicaragua’s request for 
delimitation beyond 200 nm. In the fifth preliminary objection, Colombia 
argued that the Court could not delimit the boundary beyond 200 nm because 
Nicaragua had not obtained a recommendation from the CLCS on the 
existence of its continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm.45  
17. Colombia’s third preliminary objection centred on whether matters of 
delimitation beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s coast had been “disposed of by 
                                                        
43  Submission of Nicaragua to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (24 June 2013) 
(http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nic
_66_2013.htm). 
44  Preliminary Objections of Colombia (14 August 2014), 83-135, paras.5.1-5.81 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/18778.pdf). Under Art. 59 of the 
ICJ’s Statute, “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case”. Article 60 of the 
ICJ’s Statute provides that “[t]he judgment is final and without appeal. In the 
event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall 
construe it upon the request of any party”. 
45  Preliminary Objections of Colombia, above n.44, 161-168, paras.7.8-7.24. 
12 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
the Court finally and definitively”46 in the 2012 judgment. The Court held that 
the identity of the parties, object and legal ground of a claim is insufficient for 
the application of res judicata, since “it is also necessary to ascertain the content 
of the decision, the finality of which is to be guaranteed”.47 In disposing of 
this preliminary objection, the Court made five main points. First, “although 
in its 2012 Judgment [the Court] declared Nicaragua’s submission to be 
admissible, it did so only in response to the objection to admissibility raised by 
Colombia that this submission was new and changed the subject-matter of the 
dispute”.48 From the declaration that Nicaragua’s claim was not a “new 
claim”, and therefore admissible, it did not follow that “the Court ruled on the 
merits of the claim relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast”.49 Second, and relatedly, 
“although the Parties made extensive submissions regarding the geological 
and geomorphological evidence of an extension of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles submitted by Nicaragua, the [2012] Judgment 
contains no analysis by the Court of that evidence”.50 Third, and as a 
consequence, the Court “did not […] decide the substantive legal standards 
which Nicaragua had to meet if it was to prove vis-à-vis Colombia that it had 
an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its 
coast”.51 Fourth, “the Court [therefore] did not take a decision on whether or 
not Nicaragua had an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles from its coast”.52 Fifth, the Court did not delimit the continental shelf 
boundary beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s coast in 2012 since “delimitation 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast 
was conditional on the submission by Nicaragua of information on the limits 
of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.53 
18. Three points follow from the Court’s comments in respect of 
Colombia’s third preliminary objection. First, the Court conveyed that it did 
                                                        
46  Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua 
and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 
2016, para.57 (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/18956.pdf). 
47  Ibid., para.59. 
48  Ibid., para.72. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid., para.82. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid., para.83. 
53  Ibid., para.85. 
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not accede to Nicaragua’s request for delimitation beyond 200 nm because 
Nicaragua itself had not made a submission to the CLCS for the delineation 
of its continental shelf’s outer limits. Second, in deciding whether it could 
accede to Nicaragua’s request for delimitation beyond 200 nm after having 
declared it admissible, the Court was mainly concerned with issues concerning 
evidence that Nicaragua had continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. 
Third, the combination of these two elements suggests that the Court would, 
in assessing whether coastal States have continental shelf entitlements beyond 
200 nm, refer to the evidence presented in a submission to the CLCS. In the 
2016 judgment, the Court seemed to have dismissed Colombia’s third 
preliminary objection because in the 2012 judgment it had not settled the 
merits of Nicaragua’s request for delimitation beyond 200 nm owing to the 
lack of sufficient evidence. 
19. In the fifth preliminary objection, Colombia’s argued that Nicaragua 
had failed to prove its entitlement over a continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
before the Court, as it had not yet obtained a recommendation from the 
CLCS on delineation. This would have precluded delimitation beyond 200 
nm. According to the Court, the 2012 judgment entailed “that Nicaragua had 
to submit such information [to the CLCS] as a prerequisite for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.54 This 2016 
statement clarified the condition that States must satisfy prior to making a 
request to the Court for delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  
20. The Court subsequently discussed whether “a recommendation made 
by the CLCS, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS, is a 
prerequisite in order for the Court to be able to entertain the Application filed 
by Nicaragua in 2013”.55 The ICJ emphasised that: 
[t]he procedure before the CLCS relates to the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf, and hence to the determination of the 
extent of the sea-bed under national jurisdiction. It is distinct from the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, which is governed by Article 83 of 
UNCLOS and effected by agreement between the States concerned, or 
by recourse to dispute resolution procedures.56 
The Court finally held that “since the delimitation of the continental shelf 
                                                        
54  Ibid., para.105. 
55  Ibid., para.106. 
56  Ibid., para.112. 
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beyond 200 nautical miles can be undertaken independently of a 
recommendation from the CLCS, the latter is not a prerequisite that needs to 
be satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS before it can ask the Court to settle a 
dispute with another State over such a delimitation”.57 Accordingly, the Court 
rejected Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection.  
21. However, it did so by 11 votes to five.58 The joint dissenting opinion 
of Judges Yusuf, Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, Robinson and 
Judge ad hoc Brower took issue with the Court’s decision on this point. The 
dissenting judges emphasised that coastal States have an obligation to submit 
information to the CLCS in order to obtain a recommendation only if such 
States prove that they have a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm.59 
Nevertheless, “information submitted to the CLCS pursuant to Article 76(8) 
of UNCLOS will not necessarily be regarded as sufficient to establish the 
existence of an extended continental shelf”.60 Therefore, it is the CLCS that 
decides whether a State has proven its continental shelf entitlement beyond 
200 nm. In the dissenting judges’ words, “[t]he function of the CLCS is to 
examine the submission of the claimant State and to make recommendations 
to it on whether the description of its delineation meets the criteria laid down 
in Article 76”.61 The purpose of the CLCS’s recommendation is to validate a 
coastal State’s delineation,62 and a core part of this process is proving that the 
coastal State has continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Therefore, the 
dissenting judges found it 
surprising that the majority should maintain that the submission of 
information […] was considered a prerequisite by the Court in its 2012 
Judgment […], while concluding in the present Judgment that 
recommendations from the CLCS are “not a prerequisite that needs to 
be satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS before it can ask the Court to 
                                                        
57  Ibid., para.114. 
58  Judges Yusuf, Cançado Trindade, Xue, Bhandari and Robinson voted against 
the rejection of Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection. The Court also 
rejected all other preliminary objections raised by Colombia, and is thus due 
to hear the merits of the dispute in the forthcoming months. See ibid., 
para.126. 
59  Joint Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Yusuf, Judges Cançado Trindade, 
Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, Robinson and Judge ad hoc Brower, para.55 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/18970.pdf). 
60  Ibid., para.56. 
61  Ibid., para.57. 
62  Ibid., para.58. 
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settle a dispute with another State over […] delimitation”.63 
The dissenting judges deemed the CLCS’s recommendation to be the means 
through which a coastal State’s entitlement beyond 200 nm is established. 
Until the CLCS has delivered its recommendation, there is no certainty that a 
coastal State has proved its continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm in 
accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS. It would thus follow that delimitation 
beyond 200 nm is contingent upon the CLCS delivering such a 
recommendation. 
 
IV. The submission to the CLCS as a precondition to delimitation 
beyond 200 nautical miles  
22.  In the 2016 judgment, the Court found that filing a submission with the 
CLCS is necessary for delimitation beyond 200 nm to be admissible. 
However, this clarification could be said to contradict the 2012 judgment. In 
2012, the Court found Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation beyond 200 nm to 
be admissible, although Nicaragua had not made a submission to the CLCS. 
The joint dissenting opinion appended to the 2016 judgment criticised the 
Court for this contradiction.64 This article does not examine this aspect in 
detail. The following discussion builds upon the view expressed by the Court 
in the 2016 judgment. 
 
IV.A. The relevant legal provisions 
23.  A close reading of UNCLOS does not appear to support the ICJ’s 2016 
decision on Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection. The only provision in the 
Convention’s text mentioning the CLCS and its functions is Article 76(8), 
which does not clarify the relationship between delimitation and delineation.65 
Annex II UNCLOS sets forth the legal framework for the CLCS’s work. 
Article 3 of Annex II UNCLOS states that the CLCS’s functions are: 
(a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States 
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those 
limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations 
in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding 
adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference 
                                                        
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid., paras.40-51.  
65  Art. 76(8) UNCLOS is cited in section II above. 
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on the Law of the Sea; 
(b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal 
State concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in 
subparagraph (a). 
24.  Article 76(10) UNCLOS appears to address the relationship between 
delimitation and delineation. Under Article 76(10), the provisions of the 
previous paragraphs on delineation “are without prejudice to the question of 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts”. Article 9 of Annex II UNCLOS contains a more specific provision, 
as it provides that “[t]he actions of the [CLCS] shall not prejudice matters 
relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts”. The Bangladesh v. India tribunal interpreted Article 9 to entail, 
with reference to the CLCS and international tribunals requested to delimit 
maritime boundaries, that “the mandates of these bodies complement one 
another”.66 However, Article 9 only conveys that the CLCS’s actions concern 
the delineation of the continental shelf’s outer limits, and cannot amount to 
delimitation, which does not necessarily mean that delimitation and 
delineation are wholly distinct actions not impacting on each other.  
25. Article 8 of Annex II UNCLOS envisages the case in which a coastal 
State disagrees with the CLCS’s recommendations. In that instance, “the 
coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission 
to the Commission”. Furthermore, Article 76(8) UNCLOS provides that 
“[t]he Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters 
related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf”, and 
that “[t]he limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of 
these recommendations shall be final and binding”. Article 8 of Annex II 
UNCLOS and Article 76(8) UNCLOS suggest that the CLCS may refuse to 
uphold the conclusions presented in a coastal State’s submission on the outer 
limits of its continental shelf. This refusal could prompt a revised or new 
submission by that coastal State. Suarez argued that “[t]he fundamental nature 
of the relationship between the coastal State and the CLCS is, therefore, co-
operative, and not competitive”.67 The CLCS fulfils an advisory function with 
respect to a State seeking to establish its continental shelf’s outer limits.  
                                                        
66  Bangladesh v. India, above n.25, para.80. 
67  Suzette Suarez, The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and 
its Function to Provide Scientific and Technical Advice, 12 Chinese JIL 
(2013), 339, 349. 
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26. However, the Convention makes it clear that the coastal State must 
establish the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm “on the 
basis” of the CLCS’s recommendation.68 Although the Commission’s 
recommendations are not binding, a coastal State must follow the CLCS’s 
recommendations in order for the outer limits of its continental shelf to 
become final and binding.69 Accordingly, until the Commission and a coastal 
State reach a common position on entitlement beyond 200 nm and on the 
extent of that entitlement, there can be no absolute certainty concerning the 
existence and extent of entitlement beyond 200 nm. Until that moment a 
coastal State cannot establish the outer limits of its continental shelf in full 
accordance with UNCLOS, allowing it to make such outer limits opposable to 
third States.  
 
IV.B. Interpreting the Court’s reasoning: the submission to the CLCS as an ipso facto 
proof of appurtenance 
27.  Before the Nicaragua v. Colombia cases, no international tribunal had found 
that a submission to the CLCS is a precondition for delimitation beyond 200 
nm. In Nicaragua v. Honduras, the ICJ only found that “any claim of continental 
shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76 of 
UNCLOS and reviewed by the [CLCS] established thereunder”.70 ITLOS and 
the Bangladesh v. India tribunal merely noted that the parties had made a full 
submission to the CLCS.71 However, in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) the ICJ 
                                                        
68  According to McDorman, the outer limits of the continental shelf can 
become “final and binding” under Art. 76(8) UNCLOS only if they have 
been established by the coastal State “on the basis” of the CLCS’s 
recommendation. See Ted McDorman, The Role of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World, 17 
Int’l J Marine & Coastal Law (2002), 301, 315. McDorman also stated that 
the “‘on the basis of’ requirement implies a closer fit between a coastal state’s 
claimed outer limit and Commission recommendations than the alternative 
wording of ‘taking into account’ that was considered during the 
negotiations”. See ibid., 314. 
69  Øystein Jensen, The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: An 
Administrative, Scientific or Judicial Institution?, 45 Ocean Development & 
Int’l L (2014), 171, 176-177. See also Suzette Suarez, The Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf – Legal Aspects of their Establishment (2008), 210-212; 
Kunoy, above n.26, 242-244. 
70  Nicaragua v. Honduras, above n.2, 759, para.319. 
71  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 115, para.445; Bangladesh v. India, above 
n.25, para.457. 
18 8 Chinese JIL (2009)  
 
seemed to imply that the filing of a full submission with the CLCS would 
amount to proving a coastal State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 
200 nm. This was the crux of the 2012 judgment, yet the Court was not 
entirely clear in its reasoning.  
28. A reading of the 2016 judgment, together with the individual opinions 
appended to it, could clarify the Court’s reasons for its 2012 decision. In 2016, 
the Court emphasised “the obligation on Nicaragua, as a party to UNCLOS, 
to submit information on the limits of the continental shelf it claims beyond 
200 nautical miles, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS, 
to the CLCS”.72 The Court found that:  
It is because, at the time of the 2012 Judgment, Nicaragua had not yet 
submitted such information that the Court concluded, in paragraph 
129, that “Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established 
that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with 
Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, 
measured from Colombia’s mainland coast”.73 
Nevertheless, the 2016 judgment does not clarify the reason for the 2012 
decision that a submission to the CLCS allows the Court to consider a request 
for delimitation beyond 200 nm. 
29. The joint dissenting opinion sheds light on this issue by underscoring a 
point that the 2012 and 2016 judgments did not mention directly. As 
mentioned above,74 the dissenting judges wrote that the submission of 
information to the CLCS is “conditional on the fulfilment of the ‘test of 
appurtenance’, as set out in the Guidelines of the CLCS”,75 according to 
which “a coastal State must first prove that it has a continental shelf 
entitlement that extends beyond 200 nautical miles before it is permitted — 
indeed, obliged — to delineate the outer limits of the shelf”.76 The dissenting 
judges seem to share the same view as the Court on this point. Therefore, it 
seems that what the Court had in mind both in 2012 and in 2016 was that, 
once a coastal State files a submission with the CLCS, it is confident that it 
will be able to prove that it has a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 
nm. The joint dissenting opinion could be seen to clarify paragraphs 127-129 
                                                        
72  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016), above n.46, para.82. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Section III.B. 
75  Joint Dissenting Opinion, above n.59, para.55 
76  Ibid. 
 Lando, Delimiting the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles 19 
 
of the 2012 judgment. However, it does not clarify the impact of the Court’s 
thinking on the merits of a request for delimitation beyond 200 nm. On one 
hand, the Court could assess whether a coastal State has satisfied the “test of 
appurtenance” based on the scientific evidence contained in the submission to 
the CLCS. On the other hand, the Court could simply accept that a 
submission to the CLCS, which only States able to satisfy the “test of 
appurtenance” make, ipso facto proves that a State has a continental shelf 
entitlement beyond 200 nm.  
30. The latter approach seems overly formalistic. If filing a submission 
with the CLCS ipso facto proved the existence of continental shelf entitlements 
beyond 200 nm, the Court would simply accept a coastal State’s assertion that 
such entitlements exist. However, this approach would hardly encourage the 
presentation of compelling evidence before the Court relating to the existence 
of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Moreover, this reading of 
the Court’s 2012 judgment is not based on UNCLOS, but, as indicated in the 
2016 joint dissenting opinion, on the CLCS’s Scientific and Technical 
Guidelines. Paragraph 2.2.4 of the CLCS’s Guidelines provides that if “a State 
does not demonstrate to the Commission that the natural prolongation of its 
submerged land territory […] extends beyond the 200-nautical-mile distance 
criterion […] [it does] not have an obligation to submit information on the 
limits of the continental shelf to the Commission”.77 The CLCS’s Guidelines 
were adopted by the Commission itself, and not by the States parties to 
UNCLOS,78 and only aim at “ensuring a uniform and extended State practice 
during the preparation of scientific and technical evidence submitted by 
coastal States”.79 They were not conceived to be binding on States. Referring 
to the non-binding CLCS’s Guidelines to support the view that the “test of 
appurtenance” would be ipso facto satisfied by presenting a submission to the 
CLCS seems unpersuasive. It would be more compelling if such an approach 
were based on UNCLOS itself, which, as a treaty, could be part of the law 
applicable before the Court. 
31. Furthermore, when filing a submission with the CLCS, a coastal State 
provides the Commission with detailed scientific evidence to prove that the 
outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm are identified in 
accordance with paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76 UNCLOS. ITLOS 
                                                        
77  Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS/11 (13 May 1999), 12, para.2.2.4. 
78  Ibid., para.1.2. 
79  Ibid., para.1.4. 
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underscored the “scientific and technical” character of the Commission in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar.80 If the Court considered that the presentation of such 
scientific evidence to the CLCS in the form of a full submission satisfies the 
requirement to prove a coastal State’s entitlement to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm, the mere presentation of such a submission would enable the 
Court to establish the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nm.81 However, 
under Article 8 of Annex II UNCLOS, the CLCS could reject the conclusions 
of a coastal State’s submission, whether partially or entirely, including with 
respect to the “test of appurtenance”. Therefore, filing a full submission with 
the CLCS, which would include scientific evidence on how to delineate the 
continental shelf’s outer limits, could not be seen as ipso facto proving a State’s 
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.82 
 
IV.C. Interpreting the Court’s reasoning: assessment by the Court of the evidence 
submitted to the CLCS 
32.  It seems more convincing for the Court to assess whether a coastal State 
has satisfied the “test of appurtenance” based on the scientific evidence 
identical to the one submitted to the CLCS. Nevertheless, this approach raises 
the issue concerning whether the evidence submitted to the ICJ for evaluation 
to prove entitlement beyond 200 nm should meet the same standard of proof 
as the evidence submitted to the CLCS for the same purpose. In the 
proceedings leading to the 2012 judgment, Colombia argued that Nicaragua, 
by requesting delimitation beyond 200 nm from its coast, “is not only asking 
the Court to substitute itself for the Commission, it is also requesting the 
Court to endorse its outer continental shelf claim based on incomplete, 
unannexed and ‘indicative’ materials that would never be acceptable to the 
Commission”.83 For Colombia, a State requesting the ICJ to delimit a 
                                                        
80  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 107, para.411. 
81  This situation would only concern either the case of two States having both 
filed a CLCS submission, or of only one State having filed a CLCS 
submission and whose entitlement beyond 200 nm overlaps with another 
State’s entitlement within 200 nm. 
82  Kunoy wrote that submission to the CLCS “cannot be considered a source 
of title […] which would form basis for determining the relevant area, the 
finding of which is part of the methodology of maritime delimitation”. See 
Bjørn Kunoy, The Delimitation of an Indicative Area of Overlapping 
Entitlement to the Outer Continental Shelf, 83 BYIL (2013), 61, 77. 
83  Rejoinder of Colombia (18 June 2010), 147, para.4.56, (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/124/16973.pdf). 
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boundary beyond 200 nm should meet the same burden of proof it would 
have to satisfy before the CLCS in order to prove its entitlement beyond 200 
nm.  
33. By holding in 2012 that Nicaragua’s request for delimitation beyond 
200 nm was inadmissible, the Court seemed to implicitly agree with Colombia. 
However, in the 2016 judgment the Court asserted that in 2012 it “did not 
[…] consider it necessary to decide the substantive legal standards which 
Nicaragua had to meet if it was to prove vis-à-vis Colombia that it had an 
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast”.84 
Judge Donoghue elaborated on this question in her separate opinion 
appended to the 2012 judgment. According to her: 
[i]f the information falls short of what is needed to permit factual 
conclusions by expert scientists [in the CLCS], surely it cannot be a 
sufficient basis for the Members of this Court to reach factual 
conclusions about the location of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua’s coast.85 
34.  Differently from Judge Donoghue, Judge ad hoc Mensah stated that: 
[w]hile a full submission to the Commission should not necessarily be 
required in every case to enable a court or tribunal to delimit a 
continental shelf beyond 200 miles, information that would satisfy the 
Commission should normally also be sufficient to serve as a basis for 
the court or tribunal to delimit a continental shelf […].86 
According to him, a submission to the CLCS is not always necessary for an 
international tribunal to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The 
Court could thus delimit a boundary beyond 200 nm even if it were presented 
with information less thorough than the information that would be presented 
to the CLCS. He also added that: 
the possibility should be left open that, in principle, a court or tribunal 
may be able and willing to adjudicate on a dispute relating to 
                                                        
84  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016), above n.46, para.82. 
85  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 754, para.12 (Separate Opinion 
Donoghue). 
86  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, at 766, para.11 (Declaration 
Mensah). 
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delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
depending on the information presented to it on the geology and 
geomorphology of the area in which delimitation is sought.87 
Judge ad hoc Mensah supported his views by reference to Bangladesh/Myanmar. 
However, Bangladesh/Myanmar, as well as Bangladesh v. India, should be 
considered exceptional cases, decided on their facts.88 Therefore, resorting to 
Bangladesh/Myanmar does not seem wholly convincing. Judge ad hoc Mensah’s 
words entail that an international tribunal requested to delimit the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nm would be in the position to appreciate whether the 
evidence submitted to it relating to the existence of overlapping maritime 
entitlements, even if less thorough than the evidence that would be presented 
to the CLCS, satisfies the “test of appurtenance”. This view would enhance 
the Court’s discretion to the detriment of higher certainty as to the existence 
of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Furthermore, it might also 
discourage the submission to the Court of compelling evidence relating to the 
existence of such entitlements. The threshold under which only evidence 
identical to that presented to the CLCS could satisfy the Court that a coastal 
State has met the “test of appurtenance”, endorsed by Judge Donoghue, 
appears more appropriate.  
35. There is much force in Judge Donoghue’s words. Although leaving the 
door open for the Court to decide whether the evidence submitted by a 
coastal State satisfies the high evidential threshold on a case-by-case basis, 
Judge Donoghue would limit the Court’s discretion in appreciating whether 
the evidence submitted to it is sufficient to satisfy the “test of appurtenance”. 
Her views suggest that the Court should meaningfully engage with the 
appraisal of complex scientific evidence of the same kind as the evidence 
submitted to the CLCS. In discharging this task, the Court should presumably 
refer to the CLCS’s previous recommendations, in order to adopt the same 
standard of proof required for demonstrating the existence of entitlement 
beyond 200 nm. Although delineation and delimitation are distinct processes, 
they both rest on the existence continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. 
By using the same standard as the CLCS in assessing the existence of such 
entitlements, the Court would promote a uniform approach to establishing 
whether a State is entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 
36. Stating that the ICJ may only consider a claim for delimitation beyond 
                                                        
87  Ibid., 766, para.12 (Declaration Mensah). 
88  Section V.A below. 
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200 nm on the basis of the same data required by the CLCS for delineation 
raises some issues with respect to the Court’s appraisal of evidence of 
entitlement beyond 200 nm.89 The ICJ does not seem well-equipped to assess 
the kind of scientific evidence that States submit to the CLCS.90 In their 
submissions to the CLCS, coastal States include data obtained with complex 
scientific techniques. For example, Spain’s submission with respect to the 
Canary Islands was “prepared using multibeam echosounder data, as well as 
parametric echosounder profiles, multichannel seismic data, dredges and core 
samples […] obtained over six oceanographic surveys”.91 Spain’s submission 
also included a bathymetric survey and “three multichannel seismic profiles”.92 
Furthermore, submissions to the CLCS present detailed geological data in 
order to support a coastal State’s delineation of its continental shelf’s outer 
limits.93 Commenting on Bangladesh/Myanmar, Treves emphasised that 
“interpreting Article 76 [UNCLOS] requires scientific capability”.94 The Court 
                                                        
89  With respect to the scientific evidence submitted by the parties in Pulp Mills, 
Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma acknowledged that “[t]he Court on its own 
is not in a position adequately to assess and weigh complex scientific 
evidence of the type presented by the Parties”.. See Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, 110, para.4 
(Joint Dissenting Opinion Al-Khasawneh and Simma). 
90  Section IV of Annex III to the CLCS’s Rules of Procedure is entirely 
dedicated to the “[m]ain scientific and technical examination of the 
submission” by the Commission, and mentions that the Commission shall 
examine a coastal State’s submission in order to evaluate “the data and 
methodology” employed by the coastal State itself in order to determine a 
number of elements functional to establishing the continental shelf’s outer 
limits. See also Øystein Jensen, The Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf – Law and Legitimacy (2014), 210-112. 
91  Executive Summary – Partial Submission of Data and Information on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf of Spain to the West of the Canary Islands 
pursuant to Part VI and Annex II of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (17 December 2014), 4, para.1.6 
(http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/esp77_14/esp_
2014_en.pdf). 
92  Ibid., 5, paras.1.8-1.9. 
93  See the reference in Executive Summary – Submission of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh (25 February 2011), 10, para.6.4 
(http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/bgd55_11/Exe
cutive%20summary%20final.pdf). 
94  Tullio Treves, Law and Science in the Interpretation of the Law of the Sea 
Convention – Article 76 between the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the 
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itself is unlikely to possess such capability.   
37. Moreover, if the ICJ, or other international tribunals, assessed the 
same evidence submitted by a State to the CLCS, the result would be the 
implicit rejection of the complementary role that the Commission fulfils in 
relation to international tribunals, underscored in Bangladesh v. India.95 
International tribunals would in fact pre-empt the outcome of the 
Commission’s recommendation. In addition, using the same standard of proof 
to evaluate the same evidence for the same purposes carries the risk of 
conflicting decisions by the Court and the CLCS. This would contradict the 
complementary functions exercised by the CLCS and international tribunals.96  
38. In order to avoid pre-empting the CLCS’s recommendations and 
conflicting decisions, the ICJ could choose between two options: either the 
Court stays delimitation proceedings and refers the issue of entitlement to the 
CLCS for decision; or the Court refuses to delimit a boundary beyond 200 nm 
lacking a recommendation from the CLCS. Both options would soundly 
recognise the pre-eminence of the CLCS as a technical and scientific body. 
Absent an express legal provision allowing for a reference by the ICJ to the 
CLCS, the latter option appears more viable.97 Nevertheless, the Court could 
base a reference procedure to the CLCS under Articles 30, 34 or 50 of its 
Statute. Under Article 50, the Court may “entrust any individual, body, 
bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of 
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion”. However, the Court has 
been historically reluctant to use its power under Article 50 of the Statute.98 
                                                                                                                                
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 3 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement (2013), 483, 491. 
95  Bangladesh v. India, above n.25, para.80. 
96  In his declaration appended to Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016), Judge 
Bhandari mentioned “interinstitutional comity” as a reason not to delimit the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm absent a recommendation from the CLCS. 
See Declaration of Judge Bhandari, para.7 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/154/18980.pdf). 
97  Whether the Court should await the CLCS’s decision on delineation prior to 
delimiting a boundary beyond 200 nm is discussed in section V below. 
98  See Daniel Peat, The Use of Court-appointed Experts by the International 
Court of Justice, 84 BYIL (2013), 271, 272; Lucas Carlos Lima, The 
Evidential Weight of Experts before the ICJ: Reflections on the Whaling in 
the Antarctic Case, 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2015), 621, 
622. The Court has recently appointed experts to assist it in identifying the 
starting point of the maritime boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 
the Caribbean Sea. See Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the 
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Moreover, if the CLCS were entrusted with giving an expert opinion on the 
existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm, the CLCS’s expert opinion would 
not be binding on the Court.99 Nonetheless, an expert opinion would 
expectedly be given considerable weight by the Court. In Corfu Channel, the 
Court stated that it “cannot fail to give great weight to the opinion of the 
Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving every guarantee of 
correct and impartial information”.100 
39. Article 34(2) of the Statute provides that the Court “may request of 
public international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and 
shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own 
initiative”. This provision could be the legal basis for the Court to request the 
CLCS to provide information concerning the existence of entitlements 
beyond 200 nm. However, Article 34(2) concerns access to the Court, and not 
information gathering by the Court.101 One could argue that, by being 
requested information under Article 34(2), the CLCS would be called upon to 
act on behalf of the international community. The reference to the CLCS 
could thus be seen to concern issues of access to the Court. Moreover, 
similarly to expert opinions under Article 50, information provided under 
Article 34(2) would seem not binding on the Court, although one may expect 
the Court to accord such information substantial weight. A provision in the 
Rules of Court specifically dealing with the effects of a request for 
information under Article 34(2) would seem appropriate to dispel any doubt. 
At present, Article 69(1) of the Rules of Court only repeats the provision of 
Article 34(2) of the Statute. 
40. Another alternative for the assessment of complex scientific evidence 
of the kind presented to the CLCS is the Court’s appointment of assessors 
under Article 30(2). Article 30(2) of the Statute states that “[t]he Rules of the 
Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its 
chambers, without the right to vote”. Article 9 of the Rules of Court provides 
                                                                                                                                
Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Appointment of Experts, Order of 
16 June 2016 (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/157/19054.pdf). 
99  Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues, in: Andreas Zimmermann et al. (eds.), 
The Statute of The International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2nd ed., 
2012), 1234, 1268. 
100  Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 
21. 
101  Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Article 34, in: Andreas Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The 
Statute of The International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2nd ed., 
2012), 586, 587-589.  
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that “[t]he Court may, either proprio motu or upon a request […] decide, for the 
purpose of a contentious case or request for advisory opinion, to appoint 
assessors to sit with it without the right to vote”. Assessors are not 
adjudicators, and they are perceived as fulfilling “the important task of 
translating, for the adjudicative body, the technicalities of their own scientific 
domain”.102 Assessors are thus a means to assess scientific and technical 
evidence. This system would be different from requesting information to the 
CLCS by means of a reference procedure based on articles 34(2) or 50 of the 
Court’s Statute. However, it could be a powerful instrument enabling the 
Court to grapple with the complex scientific evidence submitted to the CLCS, 
at the same time ensuring a degree of consistency between the Court’s 
decision and the CLCS’s recommendation on continental shelf entitlement 
beyond 200 nm. One could express some reservations on the resort to 
assessors under Article 30(2) of the ICJ’s Statute since, differently from the 
reports of Court-appointed experts and information received by “public 
international organizations”, assessors would not provide pieces of evidence. 
Writing extrajudicially, Judge Gaja confirmed that the assessors’ opinion 
“would not be treated as evidence before the Court”.103 Assessors would sit 
with the Court in deliberation, yet without a right to vote, which entails that 
the parties would not be able to comment on their views. Therefore, 
considerations of due process suggest caution in this regard.  
 
V. The recommendation of the CLCS as a precondition to 
delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles 
41.  In the 2016 judgment, the Court rejected the argument that an 
international tribunal can delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm only if 
the CLCS has already issued a recommendation ascertaining entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.104 However, this finding raises some 
controversial issues. 
 
V.A. The exceptional character of the Bay of Bengal cases 
42.  In Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016), Nicaragua argued that the Court need not 
wait for the CLCS’s recommendation before delimiting the continental shelf 
                                                        
102  Lucas Carlos Lima, Expert Advisor or Non-voting Adjudicator? The 
Potential Function of Assessors in the Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, 99 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (2016), 1123, 1139. 
103  Giorgio Gaja, Assessing Expert Evidence in the ICJ, 15 Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals (2016), 409, 418. 
104  Section III.B above. 
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boundary beyond 200 nm. Although it did not say so clearly, Nicaragua 
appeared to contend that the submission of information to the CLCS allows 
the Court to consider whether entitlement beyond 200 nm exists. If 
entitlement were found to exist, the Court could also delimit the continental 
shelf boundary beyond 200 nm. Nicaragua cited ITLOS’s Bangladesh/Myanmar 
judgment and the Bangladesh v. India arbitral award in support of its 
argument.105 According to ITLOS:  
the fact that the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
have not been established does not imply that the Tribunal must refrain 
from determining the existence of entitlement to the continental shelf 
and delimiting the continental shelf between the parties concerned.106  
The main reason for ITLOS’s finding was that continental shelf rights exist 
ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of Article 77(3) UNCLOS.107  
43. However, while it is correct to state that continental shelf rights exist 
ipso facto and ab initio, proving that such rights exist in accordance with the 
procedure under article 76 UNCLOS is a wholly different matter.108 The 
inherency clause does not dispense with the problem of establishing the 
existence and extent of entitlement beyond 200 nm. With respect to the 
                                                        
105  Written Statement of Nicaragua (19 January 2015), 61, para.5.22, and 63, 
para.5.25, (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/18780.pdf). 
106  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 107, para.410. Similarly, the Bangladesh v. 
India tribunals stated that “[t]here is a clear distinction in the Convention 
between the delimitation of the continental shelf under article 83 of the 
Convention and the delineation of its outer limits under article 76”, implying 
that one the latter was not a precondition for the former. See Bangladesh v. 
India, above n.25, para.80. 
107  Based on the inherency clause under Article 77(3) UNCLOS, Judge Golitsyn 
wrote that the use of the term “claims” in relation to the continental shelf is 
incorrect. States do not have “claims” over the continental shelf, as they are 
simply “entitled” to exercise their sovereign rights over it as a matter of 
international law. See Vladimir Golitsyn, Continental Shelf Claims in the 
Arctic Ocean: A Commentary, 24 Int’l J Marine & Coastal L (2009), 401. 
108  Eiriksson correctly stated that “article 77 paragraph 3, does not remove from 
the coastal State the burden of demonstrating its entitlement”. See 
Gudmundur Eiriksson, The Case of Disagreement between the Coastal State 
and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in: Myron H. 
Norquist et al. (eds.), Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits 
(2004), 251, 258. 
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continental shelf within 200 nm, both existence and extent of entitlement are 
certain. By contrast, with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm both 
existence and extent of entitlement are uncertain before the CLCS’s 
recommendation. This recommendation is necessary for the coastal State to 
establish the outer limits of its continental shelf in accordance with Article 
76(8) UNCLOS. The inherent character of continental shelf rights beyond 
200 nm entails that the CLCS’s recommendations are not constitutive of 
entitlement. However, it does not also entail that such rights are opposable to 
the neighbouring States and to the international community as a whole. In 
order for continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm to be opposable, the CLCS 
must ascertain entitlement by delivering a recommendation pursuant to 
Article 76(8) UNCLOS.109 Therefore, in respect of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm the CLCS not only ascertains a coastal State’s pre-existing 
entitlement, but it also determines whether the extent of entitlement is 
established by a coastal State in conformity with Article 76 UNCLOS.  
44. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS made the right decision for 
unpersuasive reasons.110 The Bay of Bengal cases are exceptional, which could in 
principle justify the decision to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 
At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), Sri Lanka 
demonstrated that the formula to delineate the continental shelf’s outer limits 
under Article 76 UNCLOS would have been detrimental to the States abutting 
the Bay of Bengal. Owing to the region’s geology, if the Article 76 formula 
were applied to the Bay of Bengal, a significant share of the continental 
margin would not fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal States concerned, 
including Bangladesh and Myanmar. The debates at the Third UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea emphasised that, in the Bay of Bengal, both the 
thickness of the sedimentary rocks, and the location of the foot of the 
continental slope, would determine outer limits lying well beyond the 
maximum limits set in Article 76(5) UNCLOS.111 Consequently, the Final Act 
                                                        
109  See Kunoy, above n.82, 66-67. 
110  ITLOS’s decision to delimit the maritime boundary beyond 200 nm could be 
criticised on the grounds that not knowing where the continental shelf’s 
outer limits lie does not allow it to ensure that an equitable solution is 
achieved. However, this issue falls beyond the scope of this article. See 
Malcolm Evans, Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Whatever Next?, in: Jill 
Barrett and Richard Barnes (eds.), Law of the Sea – UNCLOS as a Living 
Treaty (2016), 41, 70-77. 
111  Under Art. 76(5) UNCLOS, “[t]he fixed points comprising the line of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed, drawn in accordance with 
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of the Conference recognised that a different system could be used to 
delineate the continental shelf’s outer limits in the Bay of Bengal and in areas 
with comparable geological features.112  
45. The scientific evidence produced by Sri Lanka also proved that the 
States abutting the Bay of Bengal are certainly entitled to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm. Therefore, with respect to the Bay of Bengal entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm is certain. The only uncertainty concerns the 
exact location of the continental shelf’s outer limit, and thus the extent of the 
coastal States’ continental shelf rights. On these bases, the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm in Bangladesh/Myanmar, as well as in 
Bangladesh v. India, was in principle justified. However, since the Bay of Bengal 
cases were decided on exceptional circumstances, it is unpersuasive to rely on 
them to support that continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm can be 
effected in all situations.  
46. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS held that it “would have been hesitant 
to proceed with the delimitation of the area beyond 200 nm had it concluded 
that there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of a continental margin 
in the area in question”.113 ITLOS found that, in order to delimit the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm, international tribunals need not be 
absolutely certain that the States in dispute have maritime entitlements 
extending beyond 200 nm. ITLOS introduced a “lack of significant 
uncertainty” threshold, lower than a hypothetical “absolute certainty” one. 
Owing to the exceptional geology of the Bay of Bengal’s seabed and subsoil, 
ITLOS and the Bangladesh v. India tribunal could nonetheless consider 
themselves certain that Bangladesh, India and Myanmar were all entitled to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  
                                                                                                                                
paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall 
not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line 
connecting the depth of 2,500 metres”. See Figure 2 at Raghavendra Mishra, 
The “Grey Area” in the Northern Bay of Bengal: A Note on a Functional 
Cooperative Solution, 47 Ocean Development & Int’l L (2016), 29, 31. 
112  Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (27 October 1982), Official Records of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVII, at 148 (Annex 
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113  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 115, para.443. 
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47. However, the “lack of significant uncertainty” threshold is likely not 
easily met in other cases in which States claim a continental shelf beyond 200 
nm. Whether entitlement beyond 200 nm exists in other cases rests on the 
CLCS’s recommendations, which ascertain that the continental shelf’s outer 
limits would be established by the coastal State in accordance with Article 76 
UNCLOS. A recommendation by the CLCS would meet the “lack of 
significant uncertainty” threshold, and even provide “absolute certainty” 
concerning the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm. Nicaragua’s explicit, 
and the Court’s probable yet not explicit, reliance on the Bay of Bengal cases in 
Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016) seems therefore misplaced.  
48. An additional problem is that the Bay of Bengal cases could be seen as 
generally permitting delimitation in all instances in which both parties fail to 
disagree on whether entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm exists. 
In fact, Bangladesh, India and Myanmar had all agreed that they were entitled 
to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This appears unconvincing, since the 
agreement of the parties could not be a valid substitute for a clear statement, 
based on the appreciation of scientific evidence by the CLCS, that entitlement 
actually exists. If agreement between States were a substitute for the CLCS’s 
recommendation, States could exclude parcels of continental shelf beyond 200 
nm from the Area, to the detriment of the Common Heritage of Mankind.114 
49. Differently from Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016), Nicaragua v. Colombia 
(2012) shows that the Court had noted the exceptional character of the Bay of 
Bengal cases. In 2012, the Court referred to 
the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks covers practically the 
entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a unique situation 
and that this fact had been acknowledged in the course of negotiations 
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.115 
In her separate opinion appended to the 2012 judgment, Judge Donoghue 
also commented on the exceptional character of Bangladesh/Myanmar.116 She 
observed that: 
[t]he Bangladesh/Myanmar case illustrates that where the existence of 
continental shelf in the relevant area is not in dispute and the 
methodology and geography do not require a court or tribunal to make 
                                                        
114  Art. 136 UNCLOS.  
115  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 668, para.125. 
116  At that time, Bangladesh v. India had not been decided yet. 
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any factual finding regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf, 
the “distinct” exercises of delimitation and delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf may proceed in parallel, regardless of 
whether a State has established the outer limits of its continental 
shelf.117 
By contrast, the case between Nicaragua and Colombia was different, as the 
available scientific evidence did not unassailably prove that continental shelf 
entitlements beyond 200 nm existed. Deciding the case between Nicaragua 
and Colombia “would require the Court to reach conclusions about the same 
question of fact that the technical experts comprising the Commission would 
also address after receiving a complete submission from Nicaragua”.118 Judge 
Donoghue showed full awareness of the peculiarities of the Bay of Bengal cases. 
However, in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016) the Court regrettably failed to 
mention the exceptional circumstances underlying the Bay of Bengal cases, 
while presumably, yet not expressly, relying on them in reaching its decision to 
consider Nicaragua’s claim even in the absence of the CLCS’s 
recommendation. 
 
V.B. Nicaragua’s “practical impasse” argument 
50.  Responding to Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection, Nicaragua invoked 
the “practical impasse” argument. This argument is based on paragraph 5(a) 
of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of Procedure. Under that provision: 
[i]n cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall 
not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States 
concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may consider one 
or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent 
given by all States that are parties to such a dispute.119 
If Colombia’s argument that delimitation beyond 200 nm cannot be effected 
prior to delineation were accepted, according to Nicaragua “the result is an 
impasse: the [ICJ] would have to wait for the CLCS to act, and the CLCS 
                                                        
117  Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), above n.2, 758, para.25 (Separate Opinion 
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118  Ibid. 
119   Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 (17 April 2008), Annex I, 22. 
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would have to wait for the [ICJ] to act”.120  
 
V.B.i. The legal premise of the “practical impasse” argument 
51.  Nicaragua was presumably inspired by the Bangladesh/Myanmar 
proceedings, in which Myanmar raised the “practical impasse” argument and 
ITLOS discussed its implications.121 First, the Tribunal referred to paragraph 
5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of Procedure.122 Second, ITLOS noted 
that the CLCS had decided to defer the consideration of the submissions of 
both Bangladesh and Myanmar due to the pending dispute between the two 
States concerning the delimitation of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm.123 
The Tribunal found that “[t]he consequence of these decisions of the 
Commission is that, if the Tribunal declines to delimit the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm under article 83 of the Convention, the issue concerning the 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf of each of the Parties 
under article 76 of the Convention may remain unresolved”.124 ITLOS also 
emphasised that:  
                                                        
120  Written Statement, above n.105, 63, para.5.29. 
121  Reply of Myanmar (1 July 2011), 204-205, paras.A.18-A.19 
(https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/Rejoi
nder_myanmar.pdf). On the “practical impasse” argument, see Xinjun 
Zhang, The ITLOS Judgment in the Bay of Bengal Case between Bangladesh 
and Myanmar, 12 Chinese JIL (2013), 255, 278-279; Robin Churchill, The 
Bangladesh/Myanmar Case: Continuity and Novelty in the Law of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation, 1 Cambridge JICL (2012), 137, 148; Robin Churchill, 
Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2012, 28 Int’l J Marine 
& Coastal L (2013), 563, 579-580; Bjarni Már Magnússon, Judgement in the 
Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (14 March 2012), 27 Int’l J 
Marine & Coastal L (2012), 623, 628-630; Robin Churchill, Dispute 
Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2014, 30 Int’l J Marine & 
Coastal L (2015), 585, 609; Marcin Kaldunski, A Commentary on the 
Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India concerning 
the Bay of Bengal, 28 Leiden JIL (2015), 799, 833-834. 
122  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 101, para.386. 
123  Ibid., 102, paras.388-389. ITLOS referred to the Statement by the Chairman 
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of 
Work in the Commission, UN Doc. CLCS/64 (1 October 2009), 9-10, 
paras.35-40; Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf – Statement by the Chairperson, UN Doc. CLCS/72 (16 
September 2011), 6-7, paras.19-22. 
124  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 102, para.390. 
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it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention not 
to resolve the existing impasse. Inaction in the present case, by the 
Commission and the Tribunal, two organs created by the Convention 
to ensure the effective implementation of its provisions, would leave 
the Parties in a position where they may be unable to benefit fully from 
their rights over the continental shelf.125  
ITLOS considered itself bound to avoid the impasse that could result from 
paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of Procedure and a potential 
decision that delimitation could not take place absent delineation. The 
Bangladesh v. India tribunal endorsed ITLOS’s decision.126 This endorsement 
should not surprise, as three out of the five arbitrators had previously sat as 
ITLOS judges in Bangladesh/Myanmar.127  
52. The ICJ refrained from making any clear finding on the “practical 
impasse” argument both in the 2012 and in the 2016 judgments. Nevertheless, 
certain judges wrote on this question in their individual opinions, which may 
be indicative of the discussions within the Court. In her separate opinion 
appended to the 2012 judgment, Judge Donoghue stated that: 
If an area is not delimited and therefore remains the subject of a 
dispute, the Commission will not make recommendations about the 
outer limits (absent the consent of all involved States). And if the outer 
limits have not been established on the basis of Commission 
recommendations, the Court […] will not proceed with a delimitation. 
In effect, each institution holds the door open and waits for the other 
to walk through it.128 
In his declaration appended to the 2016 judgment, Judge Gaja wrote that “in 
most instances the delineation of the outer limits should come first, because it 
                                                        
125  Ibid., 102, para.392. Magnússon strongly endorsed ITLOS’s decision to 
uphold the “practical impasse” argument. See Magnússon, above n.26, 476-
477. 
126  Bangladesh v. India, above n.25, para.82. 
127  The three arbitrators having sat as ITLOS judges in Bangladesh/Myanmar 
were Rüdiger Wolfrum (President of the arbitral tribunal), Jean-Pierre Cot 
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would otherwise be difficult to pursue the ‘equitable solution’ required by 
Article 83 of UNCLOS”.129 He thus suggested that the CLCS change its Rules 
of Procedure “and consider submissions also when the delimitation is under 
dispute”.130 
53. Although the Court did not refer to paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the 
CLCS’s Rules of Procedure either in the 2012 or in the 2016 judgment, it 
expressly mentioned it in its 2017 preliminary objections judgment in Somalia 
v. Kenya.131 While in Somalia v. Kenya the Court made no finding concerning the 
“practical impasse” argument, the underlying idea of the decision on Kenya’s 
first preliminary objection was linked to that argument. Kenya argued that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction because the 2009 Kenya-Somalia Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)132 provided for an alternative dispute settlement means 
that, pursuant to Kenya’s reservation to the Optional Clause,133 would take 
precedence over ICJ proceedings.134 The Court found that the MOU’s object 
and purpose was “to constitute a no-objection agreement, enabling the CLCS 
to make recommendations notwithstanding the existence of a dispute between 
the Parties regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf”.135 The MOU’s 
object and purpose thus was to  overcome the obstacle created by paragraph 
5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of Procedure. By recognising that the 
2009 MOU’s object and purpose was to allow the CLCS to delineate the 
continental shelf’s outer limits despite a pending delimitation despite between 
Kenya and Somalia, the Court could be seen to have implicitly acknowledged 
the validity of the “practical impasse” argument. 
 
V.B.ii. The possibility of partial recommendations from the CLCS 
54.  The “practical impasse” argument seems legally and logically sound. The 
                                                        
129  Declaration of Judge Gaja (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/154/18978.pdf). 
130  Ibid. 
131  Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 2 February 2017, paras.68-69 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/161/19330.pdf). 
132  2599 UNTS 35. 
133  531 UNTS 114. Kenya declared that it accepted the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction in all disputes other than “[d]isputes in regard to which the 
parties […] have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other 
method or methods of settlement”. 
134  Somalia v. Kenya, above n.131, para.32. 
135  Ibid., para.97. 
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CLCS’s Rules of Procedure contain a clear provision preventing the 
Commission from making recommendations in the presence of a “land or 
maritime dispute” and lacking the consent of the States involved in such a 
dispute.136 However, paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of 
Procedure does not seem to necessarily entail that the Commission is 
prevented from making any recommendation in cases where a land or 
maritime dispute exists. If a coastal State’s submission concerned both 
disputed areas and undisputed areas, it could be conceivable for the CLCS to 
only deliver a recommendation with respect to the latter. This solution could 
find its legal basis in paragraph 3 of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of 
Procedure, under which: 
A submission may be made by a coastal State for a portion of its 
continental shelf in order not to prejudice questions relating to the 
delimitation of boundaries between States in any other portion or 
portions of the continental shelf for which a submission may be made 
later, notwithstanding the provisions regarding the ten-year period 
established by article 4 of Annex II to the Convention. 
This provision allows coastal States to make partial submissions to the CLCS. 
Similarly, it seems possible for the CLCS to make partial recommendations. 
These would ascertain, although not fully, the submitting States’ entitlement 
to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  
55. Partial recommendations could satisfy the “lack of significant 
uncertainty” threshold formulated by ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar.137 
Although a partial recommendation would not conclusively establish 
entitlement beyond 200 nm in the area to be delimited, it could do so with 
respect to the areas falling outside any potential area of overlapping 
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unlikely in any other circumstances to apply Rule 5 in order to ‘block’ the 
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entitlements. Therefore, a partial recommendation could significantly lower 
the level of uncertainty concerning the existence of entitlement beyond 200 
nm. If entitlement beyond 200 nm existed in the maritime spaces adjacent to 
the delimitation area, it could be seen to be likely, from an evidential 
standpoint, that there would exist maritime entitlements beyond 200 nm also 
in the delimitation area. In ITLOS’s words, the CLCS’s partial 
recommendation could determine a “lack of significant uncertainty” with 
respect to the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm. 
56. The CLCS has already adopted partial recommendation, for example 
with respect to Argentina’s continental shelf submission. Although a long-
standing dispute exists between Argentina and the UK on sovereignty over 
the Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina made a submission to the CLCS showing 
the disputed islands under Argentinian sovereignty. The UK sent a note 
verbale to the UN Secretary-General, rejecting “those parts of Argentina’s 
submission which claim rights over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas appurtenant to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands, and requests that the Commission does not examine those 
parts of the Argentine submission […]”.138 As a result, the Commission 
“decided that, in accordance with its rules of procedure, it was not in a 
position to consider and qualify those parts of the submission that are subject 
to dispute”.139 The CLCS’s sub-commission was thus instructed to examine 
only the areas in which there were no overlapping entitlements generated by 
the coasts of Argentina and of the Falklands/Malvinas.140 The CLCS 
submitted its recommendation to Argentina on 11 March 2016.141  
57. Although the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty dispute does not 
concern maritime delimitation, at least not directly, it is conceivable that the 
solution adopted by the CLCS in that instance could also be adopted with 
respect to delimitation disputes. The delimitation of a maritime boundary 
need not always concern the entire area in which a State claims sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf under Part VI UNCLOS. Aware that the 
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CLCS could issue a recommendation partially establishing the existence of 
maritime entitlements beyond 200 nm, an international tribunal could decline 
to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm without fearing to incur the 
“practical impasse” invoked by Nicaragua. After the delivery of a partial 
recommendation by the CLCS, which could establish “lack of significant 
uncertainty” as to the existence of entitlements beyond 200 nm, international 
tribunals could accede to a request for delimitation beyond 200 nm. However, 
this manner of ensuring “lack of significant uncertainty” concerning the 
existence of continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm seems to be case-
specific, as there could be geographical scenarios in which it could provide 
only limited help. This could be the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, 
in which the areas in dispute between two states and the delimitation area 
would likely overlap. 
 
V.B.iii. The ultra vires character of paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules of 
Procedure 
58.  One could also argue that paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS’s Rules 
of Procedure is ultra vires, which would deprive the “practical impasse” 
argument of its legal basis. Jensen wrote that “the Commission has gone 
beyond the proper limits set out in [UNCLOS] by declining to examine 
submissions affected by a dispute without the consent of all parties to the 
dispute”.142 Jensen emphasised that Article 76(8) UNCLOS uses imperative 
language, requiring that “[t]he Commission shall make recommendations to 
coastal States”. Paragraph 5(a), which gives the CLCS the power to refuse a 
recommendation, would thus directly contradict Article 76(8) UNCLOS. 
Jensen’s argument is convincing. Apart from the textual reading of Article 
76(8), which is Jensen’s basis for stating that paragraph 5(a) is ultra vires, there 
are further reasons to support his view. 
59.  First, other UNCLOS provisions including the term “shall” have been 
read as being imperative in character. For example, Article 290(6) UNCLOS 
provides that the parties to a dispute under Part XV of the Convention “shall 
comply promptly with any provisional measures prescribed under this article”. 
ITLOS interpreted Article 290(6) as endowing provisional measures 
prescribed under it with binding character.143 Similarly, Rosenne described 
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Article 290(6) as “unambiguous” in respect of the binding character of 
provisional measures prescribed under it.144 Although Article 290(6) concerns 
a different subject-matter from the one of Article 76(8), ITLOS’s 
interpretation of the former could be used as a guideline for interpreting the 
latter. 
60. Second, the lack of imperative language in Article 65 of the ICJ’s 
Statute has been interpreted as meaning that the Court can refuse to render an 
advisory opinion. According to Article 65, “[t]he Court may give an advisory 
opinion on any legal question […]”. The ICJ itself interpreted the verb “may” 
in the sense that “the Court has a discretionary power to decline to give an 
advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met”.145 Otherwise, 
using the verb “may” in Article 65 “would make no sense”.146 In respect of its 
power to render advisory opinions, the Court is in a position similar to the 
CLCS with respect to recommendations on continental shelf delineation. Both 
Article 65 of the ICJ’s Statute, and Article 76(8) UNCLOS, concern the power 
of an organ created under those instruments to deliver a non-binding opinion 
or recommendation. The ICJ interpreted the lack of imperative language in 
Article 65 of its Statute to entail the absence of a duty to render an advisory 
opinion. A contrario, the imperative language in Article 76(8) UNCLOS should 
convey that the CLCS has a duty to render a recommendation requested by a 
coastal State. 
61. There is a further reason to accept the argument that paragraph 5(a) is 
ultra vires. When the CLCS’s Rules of Procedures were being prepared, the 
States parties to UNCLOS underscored that the CLCS’s draft “provided no 
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guidance regarding the Commission’s dealing with areas which were the 
subject of disputes or with undefined boundaries between opposite or 
adjacent States”.147 Therefore, the CLCS adopted Annex I to the Rules of 
Procedure, and paragraph 5(a) therein, following a request from the States 
parties to UNCLOS. However, the CLCS refrained from adopting Annex I 
until such time as it would have been “considered” by the Meeting of the 
States parties to the Convention.148 Upon considering Annex I, States 
remarked that “the Rules of Procedure should be drafted in a neutral manner 
and should be limited to what the Commission can or cannot do, and should 
not appear to create new rights for States that are only defined by the 
Convention”.149 Such a statement was not opposed by any State. However, 
paragraph 5(a) could be said to create a right to veto the consideration of a 
submission by the CLCS. The holder of such a right would be every State with 
which another State making a submission to the CLCS has an on-going “land 
or maritime dispute”. Paragraph 5(a) could thus be said to endow States with 
rights not provided for under UNCLOS. As a result, it seems to be ultra vires 
and to have been adopted against the explicit indications of the States parties 
to UNCLOS. This could be problematic for the persuasiveness of the 
“practical impasse” argument. 
 
V.B.iv. The practical (ir)relevance of the “practical impasse” argument 
62.  A final issue with the “practical impasse” argument concerns whether the 
deadlock predicted by Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016) has ever taken 
place in practice. The CLCS’s documents suggest a negative answer. All three 
States parties to Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh v. India had a pending 
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submission at the time of their delimitation dispute. A 2009 Statement by the 
CLCS Chairperson on Myanmar’s submission reported that “the Commission 
decided to defer further consideration of the submission and the notes 
verbales until such time as the submission is next in line for consideration as 
queued in the order in which it was received”.150 With reference to 
Bangladesh’s submission, a 2011 Statement by the CLCS’s Chairperson stated 
that “the Commission decided to defer further consideration of the 
submission and the notes until such time as the submission was next in line 
for consideration as queued in the order in which it was received”.151 The 
CLCS’s Chairperson used similar wording with respect to India’s submission 
in a 2010 Statement.152  
63. The CLCS’s decision in respect of the submissions of Bangladesh, 
India and Myanmar does not convey that the Commission decided to “defer” 
their consideration exclusively owing to the existence of delimitation disputes 
involving those States. The wording used in the Chairperson’s Statements 
conveyed that the submissions would not be considered immediately, but only 
after all other submissions filed before the ones of Bangladesh, India and 
Myanmar would have been considered. The CLCS’s decisions were thus not 
actual “deferrals”. A “deferral” implies that the submission is ready for 
consideration, yet it would be considered at a later stage. Conversely, the 
CLCS simply implemented a chronological criterion under which all 
submissions would be considered in the order in which they were filed. It 
follows that one does not know how the CLCS would deal with a coastal 
State’s submission if, that submission being ready for consideration given the 
chronological order in which it was filed, a germane delimitation case were 
still subject to dispute settlement by any means.  
64. With respect to the Bay of Bengal cases, the CLCS presumably expected 
that, by the time the submission would have needed to be considered in 
accordance with the chronological criterion, ITLOS and the Bangladesh v. India 
tribunal would have settled the disputes involving Bangladesh, India and 
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Myanmar. Therefore, by that time international tribunals would have decided 
whether they could delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm prior to its 
delineation. The Commission would thus have avoided addressing the legal 
matter concerning the relationship between delimitation and delineation. The 
CLCS itself may have deemed the consideration of legal issues to be beyond 
its expertise as a technical and scientific body.  
65. This situation repeated itself in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016). With 
respect to Nicaragua’s submission, the Commission’s Chairperson wrote, in a 
2014 Statement, that: 
[a]ddressing the modalities for the consideration of the submission, the 
Commission took note of the communications from Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama; and the joint communications 
from Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama. […] The Commission also 
took note of the views expressed in the presentation by Nicaragua in 
connection with the communications. Taking into account these 
communications and the presentation made by the delegation, the 
Commission decided to defer further consideration of the submission 
and the communications until such time as the submission was next in 
line for consideration, as queued in the order in which it was 
received.153 
The wording is the same as that previously employed in relation to the 
submissions of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Therefore, the same 
considerations apply. The CLCS did not make an actual deferral, but simply 
scheduled the consideration of Nicaragua’s submission according to the 
chronological order in which it had been filed.  
66. Although it did not explicitly discuss the “practical impasse” argument 
in its 2016 judgment, the Court reached a solution in accordance with it. 
According to the Court, international tribunals requested to delimit the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm need not wait for the CLCS’s 
recommendation on the delineation of that continental shelf’s outer limits. 
However, the “practical impasse” argument, prima facie convincing, raises a 
number of problems. These problems could cast doubts on the Court’s 
decision, in the 2016 judgment, that delimitation beyond 200 nm could be 
effected absent the CLCS’s recommendation. 
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VI. The Nicaragua v. Colombia cases as a cautionary tale 
67.  This article discussed issues concerning the ICJ’s judgments in the 
Nicaragua v. Colombia cases. It addressed the ICJ’s decision in 2016 to delimit 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nm absent a recommendation by the CLCS 
on the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf. The principal 
problem concerns the ascertainment of the neighbouring States’ overlapping 
entitlements over the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, as a precondition to 
its delimitation. The delimitation of boundaries absent a recommendation by 
the CLCS ascertaining that maritime entitlements exist beyond 200 nm and 
the outer limits of those entitlements seems to undermine the central role of 
this requirement. It appears that, in its 2012 and 2016 judgments between 
Nicaragua and Colombia, the ICJ did not uphold the necessity that this 
precondition be respected in the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nm. The Court’s Nicaragua v. Colombia judgments raise questions 
concerning the proof of existence of continental shelf entitlements beyond 
200 nm which are still open. 
68. The statement that delimitation and delineation are distinct and thus 
could be carried out independently of one another raises contentious issues. 
First, the decisions in Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh v. India, to date the 
only cases in which continental shelf delimitation was effected beyond 200 
nm, could not be taken as authoritative statements that delimitation and 
delineation could be performed independently, owing to their exceptional 
character. Second, Nicaragua’s “practical impasse” argument, not explicitly 
endorsed but conceivably considered by the Court in its judgments, seems 
unconvincing. Delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm prior to the 
CLCS’s recommendation conclusively ascertaining entitlement could be seen 
to have a positive effect, as it would permit the full settlement of inter-State 
disputes concerning maritime delimitation. However, in most cases it would 
seem more appropriate for international tribunals to establish boundaries 
beyond 200 nm only after the CLCS’s recommendation ascertaining that 
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm actually exists.  
